Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson (2003) have underscored the importance of phenomenology as it anchors theoretical investigations of, for example, neurobiology, on experience as lived and articulated in the first-person, rather than simply on experimental neural correlates or on abstract representations of experience. The term “neurophenomenology” emphasizes that phenomenological data and neural correlates of experience can function as reciprocal constraints. Neurophenomenological explanations proceed in two complementary directions, from the phenomenology of first-hand experience to neurobiology , and back again, with formal dynamical models mediating each way. Neurophenomenology rejects reductive materialism and replaces it with non-reductive naturalism, i.e., a radically new biological version of dual aspect theory in which mental and neurobiological properties are viewed as two mutually irreducible aspects of one single underlying human being. Neurophenomenology relies on two key concepts: emergence and embodiment. Emergence extends and enriches the notion of natural causation, without violating the supposed causal closure of physics. Emergence entails both upwards and downwards causation. Embodiment provides the tools for crisscrossing the ‘explanatory gap’ between first-person phenomenology and third-person neuroscience. This is not closing the gap via reductionism, rather it is a way of moving productively from the one domain to the other by way of a third mediating domain, i.e., dynamical systems.

Varela and Thompson (2003) noted:
“Given that the coupled dynamics of brain, body, and environment exhibit self-organization and emergent properties at multiple levels, and that emergence involves both upwards and downwards causation, it seems legitimate to infer that downwards causation may occur at multiple levels in these systems, including that of...cognitive acts in relation to local neural activity” (p.276).

These authors cited the idea of J. A. S. Kelso who wrote: “Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.” Walter Freeman described consciousness as an order parameter and state-variable operator in the brain that mediates relations among various neurons. According to Freeman, mind is not epiphenomena, rather, it plays a crucial role in intentional behavior -- it is the task of the neurodynamicist to define and measure what that role is.

There is evidence that subjects can voluntarily affect the conditions leading to the initiation and course of seizure activity (see Francisco Varela & Evan Thompson’s “Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: a neurophenomenological perspective” in Axel Cleermans’ edited volume The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation published in 2003 by Oxford University Press). Epileptogenic zones are embedded in a complex network of other neural regions that actively participate in mental life. These networks are multiple and distributed over a large scale. The global level of integration (the result of ‘upwards causation’ ) may produce ‘downwards’ effects, acting eventually upon the local level of the epileptogenic zones. Recent studies by Varela and colleagues have demonstrated that there are deterministic temporal patterns within the apparent random fluctuations of human epileptic activity, and that these patterns can be modified during cognitive tasks (Le Van Quyen et al 1997). Varela and Thompson (2003) concluded: “...the act of perception on the part of the patient contributes in a highly specific manner, via the phase synchrony of its associated neural assembly...to pulling the epileptic activities towards particular unstable periodic orbits. Thus downwards causation need be no metaphysical will-o’-the wisp, but can be an empirically tangible issue” (p. 277). Varela integrated the phenomenology of the present moment of experience with global neural events characterized by nonlinear dynamic systems.

Personally, I witness the importance of 'downward causation' in my practice on a daily basis: persons who are suffering the relentless persecutory attacks of omnipotent beings, those plagued by ongoing voices telling them how bad they are, those who experience literally being raped by cruel persecutors, etc. Telling them this is all perhaps arising from their own fearful, angry, envious, and guilty minds makes no sense and feels like another unempathic attack. Yet, a request is made to save them from these terrifying experiences. Our sense of failure, inadequacy, and powerlessness is a direct reflection of their unbearable feelings. Containment and sharing in these feelings, without direct interpretation, I believe, indirectly helps the person to feel not so overwhelmed and helpless before these experiences. One must first start with allowing these experiences to sojourn within oneself and, importantly, not to allow them to become an obstacle in our mutual relatedness. If the therapist is able to survive this 'onslaught' without 'pushing' it back into the patient, either by denial, avoidance or a premature cognitive interpretation, one can hope that this will provide a foundation for the patient to do the significant work of integration and boundary consolidation.

Brian Koehler PhD

New York University